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ABSTRACT
We investigate the impact of random deviations in planned arrival
times on user equilibrium in an extension of Vickrey’s celebrated
bottleneck model. The model is motivated by the fact that in real
life, users can not exactly plan the time at which they depart from
home, nor the delay they experience before they join the congestion
bottleneck under investigation. We show that the arrival density
advocated by the Nash equilibrium in Vickrey’s model, is not a
user equilibrium in the model with random uncertainty. We then
investigate the existence of a user equilibrium for the latter and
show that in general such an equilibrium can neither be a pure
Nash equilibrium, nor a mixed equilibrium with a continuous den-
sity. Our results imply that when random distortions influence
user decisions, the dynamics of standard bottleneck models are
inadequate to describe such more complex situations. We illustrate
with numerical analysis how the mechanics of a bottleneck with
delayed arrivals are unstable for any continuous arrival strategy,
thus shedding more light on the non-existence result.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and
mechanism design; • Applied computing→ Transportation;
•Mathematics of computing→ Stochastic processes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the standard bottleneck traffic models, users choose a departure
time with the goal of minimizing a cost function that takes into
account waiting, earliness and tardiness penalties. The common
assumption is that given a departure time the time it takes to reach
the bottleneck is known and deterministic, and often scaled to zero.
However, this may not be the case, as there may be randomness
in the actual departure time or in the trip up until the bottleneck.
This paper explores the implications of taking this uncertainty into
account on the equilibrium behavior of the users. More specifically,
people that arrive at the bottleneck have an intended time at which
they want to arrive, but their actual arrival time will deviate from
day to day. We investigate the effects of these deviations on the
formation of the bottleneck. The users take into account the effect
of deviation on the expected cost and therefore the formation of
the bottleneck now depends on both the deviation distribution as
well as on the cost structure.
In transportation literature, the α − β − γ bottleneck model is
a popular approach to model congestion and user response in a
tractable and isolated manner, we therefore use this model in our
study. In brief summary, this bottleneck model was first introduced
by Vickrey [16] and later adjusted by Arnott [2]. It considers a
single bottleneck at which N travellers all want to arrive at their
destination at a specified time denoted by t∗. These travellers are
modeled as a fluid and are subject to costs of waiting, early and late
departure (from the bottleneck), denoted by α, β,γ respectively. The
response of travellers is captured by the assumption that they arrive
at the bottleneck according to a Nash equilibrium, meaning that
no traveller can improve its costs by unilaterally altering her/his
departure time from the origin.
The Vickrey model has been extended in many directions, ex-
amples include the capacity drop observed at highways by Arnott
[1], heterogeneity among travellers by [3, 11], and many more. A
recent overview of these extensions was written by Small [14]. A
variety of extensions that include the effects of stochasticity, have
also been considered. However, this research mostly considered
stochasticity at the bottleneck only.
Beyond the transportation literature, the response of travellers
based on common preferences has been studied for a wide variety
of applications that are closely related to the Vickrey model. These
models use queuing theory in combination with game theory. The
first model which uses a queueing approach was developed by
Glazer and Hassin [5]. They consider a game where a population
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with a Poisson distributed size choose an arrival time with the aim
of minimizing waiting time in the queue. Service times are assumed
to be exponentially distributed. Many extensions have been studied
with a broad range of application, such as a concert arrival game
of Juneja et al. [9] and [10], at which the tardiness was added to
the model, causing the order of arrivals to become relevant. In
[8] the discrete stochastic queueing model is compared with the
fluid approximation which is commonly used in the transportation
literature, and also in this paper a fluid model is assumed. A review
of this line of research can be found in Chapter 4.1 of [7].
Another model that is related to the problem we consider here
is the meeting game of Fosgerau et al. [4] and also synchroniza-
tion under uncertainty by Ostrovsky [12] who studies the optimal
strategy of individuals that incur a cost for waiting until the last ar-
rival occurrences. Both study the problem in a cooperative manner
while taking into account possible random deviations between the
intended time chosen by the players and the realized time of the
event.
In this paper, we extend the bottleneck model by assuming that
arrivals to the bottlenecks are not perfectly arriving at the planned
time instants. Alternatively, we consider a system where people
choose a time of arrival, but the actual time of arrival deviates by
some predefined probability distribution. This uncertainty results
in having a non-convex cost function. In [17] uncertainty on the
road to the bottleneck is considered, which is similar to our case.
However they include the travel time to the bottleneck in the cost
function, whereas we are interested in the stochasticity effects in
the departure time from home and therefore do not include this in
the delay costs.
The goal of our analysis is to gain insight into the effects of
uncertainty in the responses of travellers on equilibrium and the
resulting queuing behavior at the bottleneck. We analyse the impact
for various scenarios with respect to the cost function and the ar-
rival time uncertainty. We then continue to investigate whether an
equilibrium exists in our model. Our main result is that as opposed
to most bottleneck models a continuous mixed strategy user equi-
librium does not exist, and neither does a pure strategy equilibrium.
This implies that equilibrium has a more elaborate form of a mixed
strategy with multiple atoms, and therefore computing it probably
requires a more algorithmic approach.
2 MODEL DESCRIPTION
We first describe the classical Vickrey bottleneck model and then
proceed to the extension with uncertainty in the individual arrival
times of travellers at the bottleneck.
2.1 Standard bottleneck model
A fluid population with a volume of N travellers passes through a
single bottleneck of capacity µ. Each traveller strategically decides
when to arrive at the bottleneck in order to minimize his cost. It is
assumed that each traveller wants to exit the bottleneck at time t∗,
and incurs a penalty for deviations from this preference time and
for delay. This penalty is captured by a linear cost function with
coefficients α, β,γ , for waiting, early and late arrival respectively.
The time dependent cost function is represented as follows:
c(t) = αw(t) + β(t∗ − (t +w(t)))+ + γ (t +w(t) − t∗)+, (1)
wherew(t) is the waiting time within the bottleneck for an arrival
at time t . It is assumed that travellers have full knowledge of each
others behavior. The solution of the Vickrey model is given by a
Nash equilibrium, meaning that no traveller can enhance his cost
by altering his departure time. Throughout this paper we make the
standard assumption that γ > α > β , (see, e.g., [13]).
The integral of the resulting arrival rate function a(t) > 0 over
a finite interval t ∈ [ta, tb ] should be equal to the total volume of
travellers: ∫ tb
ta
a(t)dt = N ,
where N is the the total number of travellers.
Given a total amount of fluid N , we want to find an inflow curve
λ(t) such that no traveller can decrease its costs by altering its
arrival time at the bottleneck. It has been shown (see, e.g., [15]) that
such a Nash equilibrium is unique for γ > α > β , and is given by
λ(t) =
{
r1(t − ta ), t ∈ [ta, tn )
r1(tn − ta ) + r2(t − tn ), t ∈ [tn, tb ]
, (2)
where
r1 = µ +
βµ
α − β , r2 = µ −
γ µ
α + γ
, (3)
ta = t
∗ − ηN /µ1 + η , tb = t
∗ + N /µ1 + η , tn = t
∗ − δN /µ
α
,
with η = γβ and δ =
βγ
β+γ . This arrival curve gives all travellers
equal cost of
c = δ
N
µ
. (4)
For α > β the inflow rate presented in (2) generates a single busy
period, i.e.,w(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (ta, tb ) [15]. In this equilibrium, the
first and last traveller will only incur costs for early/late arrival, and
experience no delay. The traveller leaving exactly at the preferred
time t∗ encounters costs consisting only of waiting.
2.2 Bottleneck model with arrival time
uncertainty
In reality travellers do not necessarily arrive at their intended time.
We therefore extend the above bottleneck model and assume that
there is uncertainty about the actual time of arrival to the bottle-
neck. The deviation from the intended arrival time of each traveller
is modelled by a continuous random variable X ∈ (−∞,+∞) with
density f , assuming the deviations of different users to be indepen-
dent. If a(t) is continuous then f acts as a smoothing kernel over
the arrival function a(t). The resulting arrival rate function is given
by
a˜(t) =
∫ t
u=−∞
f (u)a(t − u)du . (5)
The time-dependent queue length at the bottleneck can be com-
puted by the difference between the actual arrival rate of (5) and
the departure rate µ,
q(t) = (a˜(t) − µ)+ Q(t) >= 0, (6)
where Q(t) is the queue length at time t .
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As q(0) = 0, the waiting time of an arrival at time t can then be
computed by
W (t) =
∫ t
u=−∞
q(u)
µ
du . (7)
By plugging (7) into (1) we compute the expected cost of an
arrival at time t ,
C˜(t) = αW (t) + β (t∗ − t −W (t))+ + γ (t +W (t) − t∗)+. (8)
Given a time-dependent arrival rate a˜(t) we can compute the
expected cost for a traveller that has an intended arrival time t by
E[C˜(t)] =
∫ ∞
u=−∞
C˜(t + u)f (u)du . (9)
3 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
To gain insight on the impact of uncertainty about the exact arrival
time, we demonstrate the cost over time given that travellers are
unaware of this uncertainty. We compute the impact of uncertainty
for a number of delay functions. For each, we show the impact for
an increasing level of uncertainty.
To obtain the arrival rate over time at which travellers are un-
aware of the uncertainty function f , we compute the Nash equilib-
rium λ(t) of the standard bottleneck model given by (2). Thus, the
actual arrival rate a˜(t) is computed by the convolution of the Nash
equilibrium arrival rate of Equation (3), and the arrival uncertainty
distribution of X . The actual arrival rate can be obtained by taking
the convolution as defined in Equation (5). We then plug this rate
into (8) to obtain the expected costs over time. Finally, the expected
cost for a traveller that chooses time t is calculated by (9).
The numerical evaluation of the above described rates and cost
function is carried out using the following approximating discreti-
sation scheme. The interval of the bottleneck period is split into n
small segments of length ∆ where:
n =
⌊ tend − tstar t
∆
⌋
. (10)
The probability volume of the kth segment is obtained by
pk = P[X ≤ (k + 1)∆ + t] − P[X ≤ k∆ + t]. (11)
First, we consider a uniform uncertainty distribution X . The cost
function is taken equal to the standard values from [13] where
β/α = 0.5 and γ/α = 2 (α = 1, β = 0.5,γ = 2, N=60, s=1). In
Figure 1 the results for X ∼ uni f (σ , τ ) when τ ∈ {0, 1, 5, 10, 30}
and σ = −τ are visualised. In these examples, the bottleneck period
is extended to tstar t = ta + σ and tend = tb + τ , since deviations
from the intended arrival times will cause users to arrive prior to
ta and later than tb as well. The results of Figure 1c show that the
expected cost is below that of the cost without any delay, as long as
a queue exists. In the boundaries of the arrival interval, for which
the delay is equal to the period of the bottleneck, there will be no
queue at all: travellers will only incur earliness or lateness cost,
depending on their arrival time.
Similar results appear for X ∼ exp(µ), where the delay distribu-
tion is on an infinite support. For both functions the same observa-
tions are made: decrease in the average cost function for travellers
while increasing the delay component. An important observation
is that the expected cost is not constant throughout the arrival
(a) Arrival rate with Uniform delay
(b) Cost per time unit (C˜(t ))
(c) Expected cost for a traveller with intended time t (EC(t ))
Figure 1: Impact of the arrival pattern and costs over time
for a uniform delay.
interval. Conclusion: travellers will deviate from the Vickrey equi-
librium arrival rate because they can reduce their cost. With the
same approach, this phenomenon can be displayed for other delay
distributions.
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4 OPTIMAL RESPONSES
We continue our analysis by considering the optimal response of
travellers when they take into account the uncertainty function.
We assume full information in the sense that all travellers are aware
that arrival times deviate from the intended times according to f
for themselves and all others. This will allow us to examine whether
an equilibrium exists, and under which conditions. We explore both
the options of pure and continuous mixed strategies, assuming a
uniform delay function.
To explicitly study whether a pure or mixed equilibrium exists,
we represent the departure delay by a uniformly distributed random
variable X ∼ uni f (0, 1)
f (t) =
{
1, t ∈ [0, 1]
0, otherwise
. (12)
The results can be extended to general X ∼ uni f (0, τ ) by re-
scaling time.
We first outline the simplifications in the model description that
are due to the uniform delay assumption. Plugging Equation (12)
into Equation (9) we obtain
EC(t) =
∫ 1
u=0
C˜(t + u)du .
Note that while the cost function is piecewise linear due to (1),
and hence not smooth, the expected cost has a continuous derivative
because the cost is continuous. Furthermore, as EC(t) → ∞ when
t →∞ or t → −∞, a best response of a single customer is a global
minimum that satisfies the necessary first order condition,
dEC(t)
dt
= C˜(t + 1) − C˜(t) = 0 ⇔ C˜(t + 1) = C˜(t). (13)
However, EC(t) is not convex and there may be multiple local
minima or saddle points, that satisfy the necessary condition.
4.1 Pure strategy equilibrium
We first investigate the conditions for a pure strategy equilibrium to
exist, namely a time instant such that if all travellers arrive together
then no single traveller can reduce the cost by choosing any other
arrival time. We then show that these only hold in the degenerate
case where the capacity is large enough for no queue to form,
regardless of the strategies: µ > N . For the general case we further
illustrate numerically how the non-convex shape of the expected
cost function makes a pure strategy equilibrium impossible.
We first compute the cost for a tagged traveller arriving at time
s ∈ R, given that a total volume of N decides to arrive at time
t ∈ R. We separate between two cases. When µ ≥ N , the tagged
traveller encounters no waiting time and the moment of arrival
of traveller s does not depend on the volume N at time t . The
case where µ < N , s does lead to waiting times when the actual
arrival time overlaps with the interval of arrival of the volume N .
Formally, A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is given by the fixed
point t ∈ arg mins ∈R ECt (s).
Case µ ≥ N
We determine the cost for a traveller arriving at s by
C(s) =
∫ t ∗
s
β(t∗ − u)du +
∫ s+1
t ∗
γ (u − t∗)du
= β[t∗u − 0.5u2]
t ∗
s
+ γ (u
2
2 − t
∗u)
s+1
t ∗
= β[t∗(t∗ − s) − 12 ((t
∗)2 − s2)] + γ [ (s + 1)
2
2 −
(t∗)2
2 − t
∗s].
To find the time instant that gives the best response we compute
the solution of dCds = 0, yielding the unique solution
dC
ds
= −βt∗ + sβ + γ (s + 1 − t∗) = 0 →
s(γ + β) = (γ + β)t∗ − γ →
s = t∗ − γ
β + γ
.
Thus, the best response does not depend on the arrival of the
fluid volume N . This is the same solution as in the model with no
waiting costs by [6].
Case µ < N
In case that µ < N , a queue builds during the arrival interval of the
volume N . For the sake of brevity, without loss of generality, we
assume that the total volume of travellers is N = 1. Therefore, we
need to consider the time of arrival of the volume, which is given
by a˜t (u) = 1 ∈ [t, t + 1]. Including this in ( 6), we obtain the waiting
time by
Wt (u) =

( 1µ − 1)(u − t), u ∈ [t, t + 1]
1
µ − (u − t), u ∈ (t + 1, t + 1µ ]
0, otherwise
,
where u represents the intended arrival time.
We insert theWt (u) in (8), and compute the cost for a traveller
that intends to arrive at time u given that the volume N intends to
arrive at time t by
C˜t (u) = αWt (u) + β
(
t∗ − (t +Wt (u))
)+
+ γ
(
t +Wt (u) − t∗
)+
.
Finally, we compute the expected cost for a traveller that intends
to arrive at time s by
ECt (s) =
∫ s+1
s
C˜t (u)du . (14)
Proposition 1. A pure Nash equilibrium does not exist for N > µ.
Before proving Proposition 1, we wish to provide intuition to the
non-existence result by numerically illustrating the shape of the
cost function. In Figure 2a, we plot the expected cost for a fixed t
and observe that there are either two local minima or a single local
minimum and a saddle point. Moving t affects the best response,
as is illustrated in Figure 2b. The jump corresponds to the point
where the global minimum changes from the earlier local minimum
(on the left in Figure 2a) to the one at a later time (on the right in
Figure 2a). This jump in the best response function is the reason
why no fixed point exists.
Proof of Proposition 1. We firstly compute the expected cost
for a traveller choosing intended arrival time s , given that the
volume N intends to arrive at time t . Therefore, we split the integral
58
A bottleneck with randomly distorted arrival times VALUETOOLS 2019, March 12–15, 2019, Palma, Spain
(a) Costs s for specific t
(b) Best response of s for range t ∈ T
Figure 2: Best response of s for t ∈ T for µ = 0.8.
of equation (14) into several cases. We make a division between
the case where s ≤ t and s ≥ t , and we separate between the
point where the earliness cost changes to lateness cost denoted by
x∗ = t + µ(t∗ − t).
For s ≤ t < s + 1 ≤ x∗,
ECt (s) =
∫ t
s
β(t∗ − u)du +
∫ s+1
t
αWt (u) + β(t∗ − u −Wt (u))du,
for s ≤ t < x∗ < s + 1 ≤ t + 1,
ECt (s) =
∫ t
s
β(t∗ − u)du +
∫ s+1
t
αWt (u)du
+
∫ x ∗
t
β(t∗ − u −Wt (u))du +
∫ s+1
x ∗
γ (u +Wt (u) − t∗)du,
and for t ≤ s < x∗ < t + 1 ≤ s + 1,
ECt (s) =
∫ t+1
s
αWt (u)du +
∫ x ∗
s
β(t∗ − u −Wt (u))du
+
∫ t+1
x ∗
γ (u +Wt (u) − t∗)du +
∫ s+1
t+1
αWt (u)
+ γ (u +Wt (u) − t∗)du .
We excluded the cases where s, t > x∗, and also s + 1, t + 1 < t∗
which cannot be an equilibrium because the cost function of the
at t can be trivially improved. To find the optimal time s when all
others arrive at time t we solve the necessary condition (13) for
each of the above cases.
Case 1: For s ≤ t < s + 1 ≤ x∗,
s =
α(µ − 1 + t − µt) + β(1 − µ − t + µt)
α(1 − µ) − β(2µ − 1)
↓ s = t = te
te =
α
β
(1 − 1
µ
) + 1
µ
− 1
.
this will give a negative value for any µ < 1 and α > β .
Case 2: For s ≤ t < x∗ < s + 1 ≤ t + 1,
s =
α(µ + t − µt − 1) + βµt∗ + γ (µt∗ + t − µt − 1)
α + γ + µ(β − α)
↓ s = t = te
te = t
∗ − γ
β + γ
( 1
µ
) − α
β + γ
( 1
µ
− 1)
As te has to meet the criteria of te ≥ t∗ − 1µ , we can only find a
pure equilibrium when µ > α−βα .
Case 3: For t ≤ s < x∗ < t + 1 ≤ s + 1, we obtain the same
solution as in Case 2 because the cost functions coincide when
taking s ↑ t or s ↓ t .
The above suggests that a pure equilibrium solution can only
be at te . However, it can be shown that the cost of the tagged
traveller arriving at time te when all others arrive at te , is not the
global minimum. This is done by considering the derivative of the
expected cost in the range t ≤ s < x∗ < t + 1 ≤ s + 1 (i.e., Case 3
above),
dEtC
ds
=
−α(µ − 1 + s − t) + β(s − µt∗ + (µ − 1)t) + γ (1 − t∗µ + µt)
µ
,
and observing that it is a decreasing function with s , as α > β . This
implies that te is a saddle point and the global minimum is at t > te .
The global minimum is obtained in the range t ≤ s ≤ x∗ ≤ t + 1 ≤
t + 1µ ≤ s + 1. The cost of s for this case is
EC(s) =
∫ t+1
s
αW (u)du +
∫ x ∗
s
β(t∗ − u −W (u))du
+
∫ t+1
x ∗
γ (u +W (u) − t∗)du +
∫ t+ 1µ
t+1
αW (u)
+γ (u +W (u) − t∗)du +
∫ s+1
t+ 1µ
γ (u − t∗)du,
with a first derivative dEtCds that equals
−t∗(β + γ )µ − αs + βs − αµs + γ µ(1 + s) + αt − βt − αµt + βµt
µ
.
Solving the first order condition dEtCds = 0 yields the best re-
sponse
s∗ = t
∗µ(β + γ ) − γ µ + t(α − β)(µ − 1)
α(µ − 1) + β + γ µ . (15)
In Figure 3, we illustrate for a numerical example the saddle
point at te with the global minimum s∗ > te corresponding to the
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Figure 3: Best response time s of Equation (15) for a volume
N intending to arrive at time t , where t = te .
best response. Finally, we conclude that a pure equilibrium does
not exist. 
4.2 Continuous mixed strategy equilibrium
We continue our analysis by considering a continuous mixed arrival
strategy. We formulate the conditions for such an equilibrium and
show that there exists no solution for the uniform delay function.
We further highlight why a continuous mixed strategy equilibrium
fails by a numerical approximation. We focus here only on the
non-degenerate case of µ < N = 1.
A symmetric mixed arrival strategy is given by an arrival den-
sity д(t) and cumulative distribution function G(t) such that all
travellers select their intended arrival time according to this dis-
tribution. Let [ta, tb ] be the support of the distribution д, and note
that it is finite in equilibrium. For a traveller that intends to arrive
at t ∈ [ta, tb ] the actual arrival time is t +X , where X ∼ uni f (0, 1),
as before. The arrival rate function of Equation (5) then simplifies
to
a˜(t) =
∫ tb∧t
ta∨(t−1)
д(t − u)du = G(tb ∧ t) −G(ta ∨ (t − 1)), (16)
where x ∨ y := max{x,y} and x ∧ y := min{x,y}. This allows us
to determine the waiting time when q(s) ≥ 0 for ta ≤ s ≤ t ,
W (t) = 1
µ
∫ t
ta
(
a˜(u) − µ
)+
du . (17)
Let EдC(t) denote the expected cost for a traveller with intended
arrival time t when all others arrive according to д. The realized
cost of a traveller arriving at t is then given by C˜ as defined in
(8). A distribution д is a Nash equilibrium if both of the following
conditions are satisfied for every t such that д(t) > 0
(1) EдC(t) ≤ EдC(s) for every s ∈ R,
(2) the necessary condition (13): C˜(t) = C˜(t + 1) is satisfied.
Proposition 2. A continuous mixed equilibrium does not exist.
Proof. We will show that there is no density д for which the
equilibrium condition of Equation (13) C˜(t + 1) − C˜(t) = 0 holds for
all t ∈ [ta, tb ]. First observe that
C˜(t + 1) − C˜(t) = α(W (t + 1) −W (t)) +At + B,
where A and B are nonzero constants. Therefore,
d
dt
(
C˜(t + 1) − C˜(t)
)
= α
d
dt
(W (t + 1) −W (t)) +A,
and the equilibrium condition implies that this function is zero
throughout the support. If ddtW (t) > 0 for all t ∈ [ta, tb ], then
by applying (17) we have that the equilibrium condition further
implies that a˜(t + 1) − a˜(t) = −Aα . By (16) this is equivalent to
k(t) := G(tb∧(t+1))−G(ta∨t)−G(tb∧t)+G(ta∨(t−1)) = −
A
α
, 0.
Recall that G(ta ) = 0 and G(tb ) = 1. If tb ≥ ta + 1 then
k(ta ) = G(ta + 1) −G(ta ) −G(ta ) +G(ta ) = G(ta + 1) > 0,
and
k(tb ) = G(tb ) −G(tb ) −G(tb ) +G(tb − 1) = G(tb − 1) −G(tb ) < 0.
If tb < ta + 1 then
k(ta ) = G(tb ) −G(ta ) −G(ta ) +G(ta ) = G(tb ) −G(ta ) = 1 > 0,
and
k(tb ) = G(tb ) −G(tb ) −G(tb ) +G(ta ) = G(ta ) −G(tb ) < 0,
and we conclude that both cases yield a contradiction to the assump-
tion that k(t) is constant. Note that this conclusion is unchanged if
d
dtW (ta ) = 0 because as µ < 1 it is not possible that ddtW (t) = 0 for
all t ∈ [ta, tb ], i.e., at some point the derivative must be nonzero. 
4.3 Approximation of continuous equilibrium
We propose a numerical procedure to obtain an arrival rate function
for which the expected cost per traveller remains constant on most
of the support. This method can be applied to non-uniform delays
distributions and exhibits similar properties.
We want to obtain an arrival rate a˜(t), for which the EC(t) ≈ c .
To obtain a numerical solution, we discretise the functions of Sec-
tion 4.2 by Equation (10) where [tstar t , tend ] denotes the interval
including the support of the delay function and ∆ is the stepsize. We
can also compute the probability distribution of arrival as computed
in Equation (11).
Ctarдet is equal to Equation (4), the arrival rate a˜(t) is captured
in the vector r¯ = (r1, . . . , rn ), and ϵ is a small value with which we
increase the rate at the indicated location.
Figure 4: Arrival rate intensities over time.
Algorithm 1 shows the numerical procedure that results in an
arrival rate function for which the costs over time remain relatively
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Algorithm 1 Procedure to approximate a mixed equilibrium.
1: Inputs:
n, t∗, β,Ctarдet ,v,w,pj
2: Initialize:
iLoc =
t ∗−βCtarдet−tstar t
∆ ;
ri = 0 for i = 0, . . . ,n
3: while iLoc , ∅ do
4: riLoc = riLoc + ϵ
5: for i = 0, . . .M do
6: Ci =
∑i+w−v
j=0 pjC˜j+v
7: end for
8: iLoc = arд mini {i : Ci < Ctarдet }
9: end while
constant. In summary, the procedure consists of the following steps.
We first set a target cost denoted by Ctarдet , which we want to
keep constant. We search for the earliest moment of arrival such
that this cost constraint is met. At this specific time instant we add a
small arrival volume of rate ϵ . Given the updated arrival vector, we
compute the new cost function over time. Again, we compute the
earliest moment of arrival t such thatEC(t) ≤ Ctarдet . We continue
this procedure until this condition can not be met anymore.
In Figure 4, a representation of the outcome of the approximation
procedure of Algorithm 1 is visualised. The line density indicates
the arrival rate intensity over time. We observe a large density in
the beginning, followed by a reduced density at the peak moment
x∗ (t = 24), which increases again shortly after. The arrival rate
over a specified period of time is given by the sum of the lines. We
apply a moving average filter to obtain the arrival rate function
over time.
In Figures 5 and 6, the results of these rates and the costs over
time are visualised for uniform delay function. These figures show
that for a larger uncertainty, obtaining a constant cost function
becomes more difficult.
In Table 1, we observe that the total amount of travellers passing
the bottleneck decreases with respect to delay, while fixing the
expected cost to the value of Equation (4). Conclusions on the
impact of arrival time uncertainty with respect to disutility can not
be made, as the current results are not in equilibrium. However, this
does suggest that uncertainty increases the disutility of individual
travellers.
Table 1: Total amount of travellers (N ) for fixed costs with
varying delay function f (t) and mean delay τ .
Uniform Exponential
τ = 0 60 60
τ = 1 59.6 59.2
τ = 5 58.7 56.5
τ = 10 57.5 54.1
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated the impact of uncertainty when timing
arrival to a bottleneck. Our model allows a random deviation from
(a) Arrival rate
(b) Cost function
Figure 5: Approximated equilibrium function for X ∼
unif(0, 1).
the intended arrival times of users to a congestion bottleneck. Such
a random distortion models the fact that the actual arrival time of
users at a specific congestion point can not be completely controlled
by the users. In reality it is common that the departure times from
the points of origin, and the delays incurred before reaching the
specific bottleneck can only be estimated up to a certain confidence
range.
We have shown that the equilibrium rate of the Vickrey model
without distorted arrivals is, in general, not a good approximation
for a possible equilibrium in the model with distortions. The nu-
merical analysis further showed that costs are reduced for almost
the entire bottleneck period, while for highly variable uncertainty
distributions, the costs spikes up at the end of the bottleneck period.
This is due to the possibility of arrival after the end of the standard
bottleneck period.
In fact, we have shown that standard user equilibrium solutions,
namely pure strategy or continuous mixed strategy, do not exist
for this model. We showed how the dynamics of delayed arrivals
inhibits the existence of a constant expected cost function. This
calls for future work seeking more elaborate equilibrium solutions
that involve mixed strategies that are atomic and not continuous,
i.e., may have multiple times with a volume of arrivals. A feasible
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(a) Arrival rate
(b) Cost function
Figure 6: Approximated equilibrium function for X ∼
unif(0, 10).
approach to do this may be by constructing a search algorithm
that iteratively changes the volume at local minima points that
appear in the cost function when the arrival strategy has masses
(see Figure 2).
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